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Abstract
In this paper we consider a network with interactions by two users. Each of them repeat-
edly issues download requests on the network. These requests may be unsuccessful due to
congestion or non-congestion related errors. A user decides when to cancel a request (that
is, what his impatience threshold is) and how long to wait before reissuing his request
after cancellation of the previous request (that is, what his waiting time will be). This
pair of impatience threshold and waiting time is his strategy. If a customer decides not
to wait but to reissue his request immediately, that is, he sets his waiting time to zero,
then he is said to use a so-called restart strategy. The goal of the user is to maximize the
number of successful requests over a given time span.
We study optimal strategies for the users in a game-theoretic framework. We find that
in case congestion is the only cause of unsuccessful requests then each of the users will
be very patient and any waiting time is optimal. Hence, restart strategies are among the
optimal strategies. Second, in case non-congestion related errors may occur, users will
also set large impatience times, but now they will set waiting times to zero; in other words:
they immediately reissue an unsuccessful download. In this case all optimal strategies are
restart strategies. Hence, in both cases restart strategies are among the optimal strategies.
Finally, implementing social optimal strategies instead of individual optimal ones cannot
improve the efficiency of the network usage.
Key words: network efficiency, congestion, impatience, restart strategy, noncooperative
game
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1 Introduction
The amount of traffic transmitted over the Internet traffic is ever increasing. The main part
of this traffic consists of transfers like video, data, email, etc. The completion times of these
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tasks vary over time due to several causes. A first, evident, cause of varying completion times
is Internet congestion: as the level of congestion fluctuates, the completion times do so as
well. In the second place, one often observes that if a webpage takes a long time to download,
then pressing the reload button may result in the page being promptly loaded. In this case
we say the download request was hindered by non-congestion related errors. Users, or agents,
on the Internet do not know which of these two causes, if any, occurs. Hence, it may be
attractive for an agent to reissue his request immediately instead of reissuing it after a break.
An agent might cancel a request if he feels he has been waiting too long; this personal
maximum waiting time is called his impatience threshold. After canceling a request he might
want to wait some time before putting down a new request if he believes this improves his
chances on a completion time smaller than his impatience threshold. If he decides to use a
zero waiting time, this agent is said to use a so-called restart strategy [2]. Such a strategy is
often used on the web when a page seems to take too long to be retrieved: users impatiently
press the reload button, and, as mentioned above, often the page is promptly downloaded.
Upon completion of a request the agent spends some time reading or studying the material
that was downloaded from the network. After finishing this, he immediately puts down a
new request for a download. The problem under study is to determine for each agent an
impatience threshold and a waiting time that maximize his number of successful requests
over a given time span.
Various related problems have been studied in the literature. Chalasani, Jha, Shehory and
Sycara [1] study restart strategies for agents on the web as a tool for reducing the expected
completion times. Completion times are modeled by random variables with a certain distri-
bution. The authors present optimal restart strategies for several distributions of completion
times, as well as conditions under which these strategies indeed reduce the expected comple-
tion time. Schroeder, Boro and McCann [5] also consider immediate reissuing of requests.
They consider four phases of agent interaction and determine restart strategies such that the
mean completion time of requests for some sample data is minimized. Maurer and Huberman
[2] conducted several simulations in which users decide whether or not to use the Internet.
Their findings are that in case of multiple users there exist optimal restart strategies. Van
Moorsel and Wolters [6] analyze and optimize the completion time for a class of jobs under
restarts. Their restart times correspond to our impatience thresholds, so these times deter-
mine when to abort a download request. Their results include algorithms that optimize the
restart policy and they identify characteristics of optimal restart times.
In this paper we have chosen to consider the most stylized setting possible: we study a
resource used by two users (or: customers). A user not only decides when to cancel a request
(that is, what his impatience threshold is) but also may decide to wait a certain time before
reissuing his request (that is, what his waiting time is). If a customer decides not to wait
then his strategy is a restart strategy. Furthermore we consider the two causes of unsuccessful
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requests identidied above: congestion due to simultaneous network usage, and non-congestion
related errors.
An interesting feature of our model is that the customers do not know if any of these two
causes occur. The goal of each customer is to maximize his number of successful requests
over a given time span by choosing a suitable impatience threshold and waiting time. Since
the choice of one agent influences the outcome of the other, the two customers are involved in
a two-person noncooperative game. The layout of this game is simple but the game itself is
difficult to analyze due to the fact that the times the customers spend on successful download
requests are stochastic by assumption. Therefore, simulation is used to study equilibria of
this game.
Our results are as follows. First, in case congestion is the only cause of unsuccessful requests
then each of the users will be very patient and any waiting time is optimal. Hence, restart
strategies are just one class of optimal strategies. Second, in case non-congestion related
errors may occur users will also set large impatience times but now they will set waiting
times to zero, that is, they immediately reissue an unsuccessful download. In this case all
optimal strategies are restart strategies. Hence, in both cases restart strategies are among
the optimal strategies. Finally, we argue that implementing social optimal strategies, rather
than ‘individually optimal’ strategies, does not improve the efficiency of the network usage.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section we introduce our model. We
assume first that congestion is the only source of unsuccessful downloads. In Section 3 non-
congestion related errors may occur. Thereafter, in Section 4 the efficiency of the network
usage is studied. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
In this section we describe and study a model of repeated network interactions with congestion.
Later, in Section 3 we extend our model to include non-congestion related errors.
Consider two customers who wish to download and read pages from a network. If both use
the network at the same time, the network is congested, and we say that the network is busy
and slow; otherwise the network is fast. Clearly, in congestion periods it takes relatively long
to complete a download. If the network is congested while the customer tries to download his
page, he may get impatient before the page is completely downloaded (more precisely: his
impatience-threshold is reached). Then he cancels the download attempt, waits some time
(because he notices that the network was congested) and issues a new download request.
When issuing such a request, customers cannot see whether the network is congested or not,
and in addition they do not know the characteristics of the other user.
Customer 1 wishes to download pages of size J1 (J1 is the time it takes to download such a
page in an uncongested network). If downloading such a page takes longer than his impatience
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threshold T1, he will cancel the request and wait for a time W1 before starting a new attempt.
If downloaded successfully, he reads the page in a time R1, a realization of his exponential
distributed reading time, after which he starts to download the next page. The impatience
threshold should be such that T1 ≥ J1, shorter thresholds make no sense because the page
will never be completely loaded then, and T1 ≤ 2J1, if the network is congested any page will
be loaded twice as slow since both customers receive an equal share of the network capacity.
Similarly we define the parameters J2, T2 (J2 ≤ T2 ≤ 2J2), W2 and R2 for customer 2.
Notice that if all parameters Ji, Ti, Wi and Ri would be exponentially distributed, then our
model may be formulated as a Markov chain. Unfortunately, this chain cannot be analyzed
in explicit terms. Hence, we consider a model with a single stochastic component.
Suppose first that congestion is the only cause of unsuccessful download requests (we come
back to this in Section 3). At any time the situation si of customer i can be described by a
five-tuple
si = (mi, ai, qi, ti, ni).
In this situation mi is the nearest point of time when customer i will change his action.
For example, if a page is fully downloaded then he will start to read it. Thus, when the
download request is completed, the customer’s action changes from downloading to reading.
The current action (waiting (w), downloading (d), or reading (r)) of customer i is described
by ai ∈ {w, d, r}. If the customer is currently downloading a webpage, ai = d, the expected
amount of the page to be downloaded at timemi is qi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ Ji. Future actions may change
this amount. Further, the download request should be fulfilled before time ti, which is the
time the current download started incremented by the impatience threshold Ti. Otherwise
the customer becomes impatient and will cancel the download at time ti. Finally, ni is the
number of pages already downloaded and read by this customer. Since customer i does not
know whether or not the network is congested, he does not know mi and qi while he uses the
network. The customer only notices a change of action if a page is downloaded successfully,
if he becomes impatient or if he finished waiting or reading.
We assume the process starts at time t = 0 and that both customers start downloading a
page at that time. Thus the network is congested and the customers share the capacity of
the network equally. It takes customer i a time 2Ji to download his page while he becomes
impatient at time Ti. Because Ti ≤ 2Ji the customer will change action at time Ti when
Ti/2 ≤ Ji of the page will be loaded. Hence, initially
si = (Ti, d, Ti/2, Ti, 0).
The situations change at time t = min{m1,m2}, the nearest point of time when one of the
customers changes action. Suppose first that the situations only change due to a change of
action by customer i, that is, t = mi < mk.
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ai ak new si new sk
d d, r, w (t+Wi, w, qi, ti, ni) (mk, ak, qk, tk, nk)
if Ji > qi, if ak 6= d,
(t+Ri, r, qi, ti, ni) (Jk +mk/2− qk + t/2, d, Jk, tk, nk)
else else if Jk +mk/2− qk + t/2 ≤ tk,
(tk, d, qk −mk/2 + tk − t/2, tk, nk)
else
r, w d (t+ Ti, d, Ti/2, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (2Jk + 2mk − 2qk − t, d, Jk, tk, nk)
if 2Jk + 2mk − 2qk − t ≤ tk,
(tk, d, qk −mk + tk/2 + t/2, tk, nk)
else
r, w r, w (t+ Ji, d, Ji, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (mk, ak, qk, tk, nk)
Table 2.1: Change of situations at time t = mi < mk when customer i changes action.
Assume first that customer i was downloading, ai = d. Then he will change action at
time t because he successfully downloaded a page, qi = Ji, or because he gets impatient,
t = ti. If the download was successful the customer will start reading the page at time
t = mi. Reading the page takes a time Ri and changes the situation of customer i to
si = (t+Ri, r, qi, ti, ni). If the customer gets impatient before finishing the download, t = ti,
he will wait a time Wi before trying a new attempt, si = (t + Wi, w, qi, ti, ni). Now that
customer i becomes inactive, the situation of the other customer, customer k may change.
If this customer was reading or waiting, then his situation remains unchanged. Otherwise,
if customer k was also downloading then the network was congested up to time t, although
the customer did not know this. At time t customer k already downloaded the amount
qk − (mk − t)/2. (Recall that qk is the expected amount downloaded by customer k at
time mk > t.) Now that the network is not congested as of time t the remaining amount
Jk − (qk − (mk − t)/2) can be downloaded twice as fast as before. If this is completed before
the customer gets impatient, t + Jk − (qk − (mk − t)/2) ≤ tk then his situation becomes
sk = (t+ Jk − (qk − (mk − t)/2), d, Jk, tk, nk). Otherwise, another tk − t can be downloaded
before getting impatient, sk = (tk, d, qk − (mk − t)/2 + tk − t, tk, nk).
If customer i was reading or waiting then his change of action at time t = mi means that he
will start a new download. If the other customer is downloading, ak = d then the network
is congested as of time t, although the customers do not know this. Hence, customer i will
be impatient before completing his download while customer k is confronted with a slower
network. If customer k was reading or waiting, then customer i expects a successful download.
For details see Table 2.1 where δi is a 0-1 variable indicating whether or not customer i finished
reading: δi = 1 if ai = r and δi = 0 if ai = w.
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ai ak new si new sk
d d, r, w (t+Ri, r, qi, ti, ni) (t+ Jk, d, Jk, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
if Ji = qi, if ak 6= d
(t+Wi, w, qi, ti, ni) (t+Rk, r, qk, tk, nk)
else else if Jk = qk,
(t+Wk, w, qk, tk, nk)
else
r, w r, w (t+ Ti, d, Ti/2, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (t+ Tk, d, Tk/2, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
Table 2.2: Change of situations at time t = mi = mk when both customers change action.
It may also happen that both customers change actions at time t, t = m1 = m2. The resulting
changes of situations are described in Table 2.2.
Each customer wishes to maximize the expected number of pages he can download and read
in some time interval x by choosing a suitable stationary strategy pair of impatience threshold
and waiting time that solves his optimization problem
max
Ti,Wi
ni(Ti,Wi, Tk,Wk) (2.1)
given the strategy (Tk,Wk) of the other user. This dependence on each other’s strategies
implies that the two customers are actually involved in a two-player noncooperative game.
Each customer tries to optimize his objective function given the strategy of the other. The
strategy pairs (T ∗i ,W
∗
i ) and (T
∗
k ,W
∗
k ) of the customers are called Nash equilibrium strategies,
[4], or optimal strategies, if none of the customers can download and read more pages by
unilateral deviation. Hence,
ni(T ∗i ,W
∗
i , T
∗
k ,W
∗
k ) ≥ ni(Ti,Wi, T ∗k ,W ∗k )
for all customers i and all strategies (Ti,Wi). The Tables 2.1 and 2.2 indicate that the anal-
ysis of this game with its repeated network interactions is difficult and complex because of
the stochastic reading times although the basic model is simple. Conventional methods in
noncooperative game theory cannot handle stochastic components, and so, it is hard to deter-
mine equilibria of this game. Therefore, simulation is used to study optimal strategies in this
two-person network. For this, assume that the reading times of customer i are exponentially
distributed with parameter li. (Hence, customer i has an expected reading time of 1/li.) Our
simulation model is based on the processes as described in the Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
To solve the optimization problems of the customers, sequential optimization is used. Consider
the situation in which the customers first optimize over their impatience thresholds Ti, i = 1, 2,
while keeping the waiting time Wi fixed, and thereafter optimize over their waiting times.
Simulation results, using a 95% confidence interval, are:
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Cust. 1 T2 = 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0
T1 = 3.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.37
3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 43.10
3.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 44.85
3.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.53
3.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.13
4.00 49.85 50.11 50.24 50.30 50.70 50.90
Cust. 2 T2 = 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0
T1 = 3.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.06
3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.98
3.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.06
3.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.98
3.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.39
4.00 34.73 35.10 35.45 35.78 35.84 36.04
Table 2.3: Simulations with small job differences. The tables above show the average number
of pages downloaded and read by customer 1 (upper table) and customer 2 during a time period
of length 300 over 1000 simulation runs. In these simulations the job sizes are J1 = 2 and
J2 = 3, the reading times are exponentially distributed with parameters l1 = 1/3 and l2 = 1/4,
and the waiting times are Wi = 0. All numbers in the tables are rounded to two decimals.
The numbers in boldface indicate the unique equilibrium Ti = 2Ji, i = 1, 2.
• Similar job sizes (e.g. J1 = 2, J2 = 3): equilibrium strategies satisfy T ∗i = 2Ji and
W ∗i ≥ 0 arbitrary, i = 1, 2. (See Table 2.3 for an example.)
• Large differences in job sizes (e.g. J1 = 1, J2 = 30): without loss of generality assume
J1 < J2, then equilibrium strategies satisfy T ∗1 = 2J1, T ∗2 ∈ [f2, 2J2] with J2 < f2 < 2J2
and W ∗i ≥ 0 arbitrary. (See Table 2.4 for an example.)
Figure 2.1 shows upper and lower bounds on the equilibrium values of T2 as a function of
the differences in job size. At first, when job sizes are similar customer 2 will be as patient
as possible, T2 = 2J2, as noted above. As the differences in job size grow, the lower bound
reaches 1.5J2 while the upper bound remains at 2J2. Both bounds are determined by means
of a 95% confidence interval.
The simulation result for similar job sizes can be explained as follows. Setting Ti = 2Ji
implies that customer i is as patient as possible. Upon doing so, any download attempt will
be successful since any download lasts for a time of at most 2Ji. The customer never has
to abort a download and consequently never has to wait for a time Wi before starting a
new attempt. Hence, since all download attempts are successful the customer optimizes the
number of pages he can read. Setting a waiting time Wi is superfluous, and hence any waiting
time will be optimal.
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Cust. 1 T2 = 45 48 51 54 57 58 59 60
T1 = 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.92
1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.29
1.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.95
1.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.39
2.00 86.49 86.32 86.62 86.51 86.62 86.13 86.20 86.67
Cust. 2 T2 = 45 48 51 54 57 58 59 60
T1 = 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.42
1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.41
1.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.89
1.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.49
2.00 3.15 3.17 3.18 3.16 3.16 3.17 3.20 3.16
Table 2.4: Simulations with large job differences. The tables above show the average number
of pages downloaded and read by customer 1 (upper table) and customer 2 during a time period
of length 300 over 1000 simulation runs. In these simulations J1 = 1, J2 = 30, l1 = 1/2 and
l2 = 1/45, and Wi = 0. All numbers in the tables are rounded to two decimals. The numbers
in boldface indicate the equilibria (T1, T2) = (2J1, f2) with 8J2/5 ≤ f2 ≤ 2J2.
3 Extended model with non-congestion related errors
The previous analysis only considered unsuccessful downloads of webpages due to congestion
on the network. In this section we extend our model to include non-congestion related errors
as a second cause of unsuccessful download requests. Assume that at the beginning of each
download attempt such an error takes place with a probability p. If it occurs, we assume
that the download request is completely ignored, that is, to the network it seems as if the
responsible customer did not put down the request. After a time Ti the customer notices that
his download request is not fulfilled and hence, he will cancel the request and wait for a time
Wi before putting down a new one.
If action e denotes the fact that a customer is confronted with a non-congestion related error
although he himself is not aware of it, then the initial situations in the download process at
time t = 0 are
si = (Ti, d, Ti/2, Ti, 0), i = 1, 2, with probability (1− p)2,
s1 = (T1, e, 0, T1, 0), s2 = (J2, d, J2, T2, 0) with probability p(1− p),
s1 = (J1, d, J1, T1, 0), s2 = (T2, e, 0, T2, 0) with probability p(1− p),
si = (Ti, e, 0, Ti, 0), i = 1, 2, with probability p2.
As of the next decision moment t = min{m1,m2} the process evolves as described in the
Tables 3.1 (t = mi < mk) and 3.2 (t = mi = mk). Notice that for a probability p = 0 these
processes boil down to those without non-congestion related errors as described in Section 2.
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Figure 2.1: Bounds of T2 as a function of job size differences. The results shown are the
averages over 1000 simulations over a period of length 400 in which f2 ∈ {J2, 76J2, . . . , 2J2}.
Simulation results with p = 0.10 are as follows:
• Similar job sizes (e.g. J1 = 2, J2 = 3): a unique equilibrium strategy T ∗i = 2Ji and
W ∗i = 0, i = 1, 2.
• Small differences in job sizes (e.g. J1 = 1, J2 = 6): without loss of generality assume
J1 < J2, then equilibrium strategies satisfy T ∗1 = 2J1, T ∗2 ∈ [f2, 2J2] with J2 < f2 < 2J2
and W ∗i = 0.
• Large differences in job sizes (e.g. J1 = 1, J2 = 50): assume J1 < J2, then equilibrium
strategies satisfy T ∗1 = 2J1, T ∗2 ∈ [f2l, f2h] with J2 < f2l < f2h < 2J2 and W ∗i = 0.
Notice that in all equilibria the customer with the smallest job size, say customer 1, will be as
patient as possible, T ∗1 = 2J1. Further notice that none of the customers waits after canceling
an unsuccessful download request. Both of them choose for immediate reattempts, which has
a negative effect on the network congestion. These restarts seems logical since a customer
may conclude from an unsuccessful download request under Ti = 2Ji that it was caused
by a non-congestion related error. Therefore, it makes no sense to wait and the customer
chooses for an immediate repetition of the download request. Hence, under the presence of
non-congestion related errors all equilibrium strategies are restart strategies.
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ai ak new si new sk
d d, e, r, w (t+Wi, w, qi, ti, ni) (mk, ak, qk, tk, nk)
if Ji > qi, if ak 6= d,
(t+Ri, r, qi, ti, ni) (Jk +mk/2− qk + t/2, d, Jk, tk, nk)
else else if Jk +mk/2− qk + t/2 ≤ tk,
(tk, d, qk −mk/2 + tk − t/2, tk, nk)
else
e d, e, r, w (t+Wi, w, 0, ti, ni) (mk, ak, qk, tk, nk)
r, w d, e, r, w with probability p:
(t+ Ti, e, 0, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (mk, ak, qk, tk, nk)
with probability 1− p:
(t+ Ji, d, Ji, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (mk, ak, qk, tk, nk)
if ak 6= d, if ak 6= d,
(t+ Ti, d, Ti/2, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (2Jk + 2mk − 2qk − t, d, Jk, tk, nk)
else else if 2Jk + 2mk − 2qk − t ≤ tk,
(tk, d, qk −mk + tk/2 + t/2, tk, nk)
else
Table 3.1: Change of situations at time t = mi < mk in the presence of non-congestion related
errors.
4 Efficiency of network usage
Motivated by the results in the previous section we investigate now whether the equilibrium
outcomes ni(T ∗,W ∗) of both customers can be improved upon. That is, is it possible for
both customers to reach outcomes larger than ni(T ∗,W ∗) in a framework different from the
previously-used noncooperative game? To answer this question, we consider a social welfare
framework, which considers the utility of the society, the two-customer network. This utility
depends on both customers’ strategies and in its optimum the usage of the network will be
at least as efficient as under individual optimization. Define the social welfare S as follows
(cf. [3]):
S(T,W ) =
1
1− α
2∑
i=1
(ni(T,W ))1−α.
The goal is to optimize the social welfare S(T,W ) for a given number α. The above for-
mulation of the social welfare includes several well-known utility optimization criteria. For
example, for α → 0 the total number of pages read is maximized; for α → 1 proportional
fairness (maximize
∑2
i=1 log(ni(T,W ))) is obtained; for α→ 2 the potential loss is minimized;
and finally, for α→∞ we obtain max-min fairness.
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ai ak new si new sk
d, e d, e (t+Ri, r, qi, ti, ni) (t+Rk, r, qk, tk, nk)
if Ji = qi, if Jk = qk,
(t+Wi, w, qi, ti, ni) (t+Wk, w, qk, tk, nk)
if Ji 6= qi or ai = e if Jk 6= qk or ak = e
d, e r, w (t+Ri, r, qi, ti, ni) with probability 1− p:
if Ji = qi, (t+ Jk, d, Jk, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
(t+Wi, w, qi, ti, ni) with probability p:
if Ji 6= qi or ai = e (t+ Tk, e, 0, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
r, w r, w with probability (1− p)2:
(t+ Ti, d, Ti/2, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (t+ Tk, d, Tk/2, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
with probability p(1− p):
(t+ Ti, e, 0, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (t+ Jk, d, Jk, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
with probability p(1− p):
(t+ Ji, d, Ji, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (t+ Tk, e, 0, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
with probability p2:
(t+ Ti, e, 0, t+ Ti, ni + δi) (t+ Tk, e, 0, t+ Tk, nk + δk)
Table 3.2: Change of situations at time t = mi = mk in the presence of non-congestion related
errors.
To implement the social optimal outcome (Tˆα, Wˆα), we assume that each of the customers
pays a price z per download request. As a consequence, each customer’s optimization problem
changes from maxTi,Wi ni(T,W ) to maxTi,Wi ui(T,W ) with
ui(T,W ) = ni(T,W )− z(ni(T,W ) + n¯i(T,W )),
where n¯i(T,W ) is the number of unsuccessful download requests of customer i. We say
that the customers can implement the social optimal outcome if each of them optimizes his
utility ui(T,W ) by selecting (Tˆαi , Wˆ
α
i ) for a given price z. That is, it is a Nash equilibrium:
ui(Tˆα, Wˆα) ≥ ui(Ti,Wi, Tˆαk , Wˆαk ) for all strategies (Ti,Wi).
In our two-customer network it turns out that different values of α have little influence
on the social optimal strategies of the customers. Further, all social optimal strategies are
implementable by the customers, that is, they are Nash equilibria. Since these equilibria
have the same structure as the equilibria in the previous section, the efficiency of the network
usage under social welfare is the same as under the previously studied individual optimization.
Hence, social welfare cannot improve upon the efficiency of the network usage.
The following causes underly these results. First, notice that
ui(T,W ) = (1− z)ni(T,W )− zn¯i(T,W ),
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and maximizing the number of pages read ni(T,W ), or the number of successful download
requests, is equivalent to minimizing the number of unsuccessful download requests n¯i(T,W ).
Hence, if the price z is not too high, z < 1, then maximizing ui(T,W ) boils down to max-
imizing ni(T,W ). This explains why the social optimal strategies have the same structure
as the Nash equilibria under individual optimization. Second, a Nash equilibrium is a kind
of max-min fair solution. Hence, it corresponds to the social optimal strategy for α → ∞.
Together with the first cause, this motivates the first result that the social optima are ap-
proximately equal for different values of α. Third, all strategies are stationary over time
by assumption. This restricts the strategy space of the customers. If we would allow for
non-stationary strategies then one may expect to achieve efficiency improvements, but this is
hard to analyze due to the stochastic reading times. On the other hand, stationary strategies
are easier to use in practice than non-stationary ones and they go well with the stationary
stochastic reading times.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied interactions of two customers on a network. Both customers re-
peatedly issue download requests. At first we considered a model in which congestion is the
only cause of unsuccessful requests. It turned out that in all equilibrium strategies of the
customers the length of the waiting times can be chosen arbitrarily. Hence, restart strategies,
which have a waiting time of length zero, are among the equilibrium strategies. Hereafter
the model was extended to include non-congestion related errors as a second cause of failed
download attempts. Now, in all equilibrium strategies the optimal waiting times have a length
of zero. Hence, all equilibrium strategies are restart strategies since the customer will imme-
diately reissue his request after canceling it. Both the basic and the extended model confirm
the optimality of restart strategies, as in [2].
Our results depend strongly on the fact that there are just two customers using the network.
For example, consider in our extended model a very patient customer with impatience thresh-
old Ti = 2Ji. If this customer is confronted with an unsuccessful download request then he
knows for sure that this is caused by a non-congestion related error. If there are 3 customers
then the analysis becomes considerably more complicated. First, the number of different
cases due to different job sizes increases considerably. Second, it need not be the case that
Ti = 3Ji is optimal in case of similar job sizes and congestion being the only cause of failed
attempts. For example, if at all times at most 2 of the 3 users use the network then Ti = 2Ji
would lead to a larger number of successfull downloads. Further, if Ji is large enough then
customers need not be willing to wait for a time of 3Ji. More general, in case of n customers
using the network, a customer would have to wait for a time of nJi before knowing for sure
the cause of an unsuccessful request. But this seems very unlikely since impatience thresholds
will be lower than nJi if n is large enough. Therefore, the results will change if more than 2
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customers are considered. Hence, an interesting extension of this study is to investigate what
happens to the optimality of restart strategies when the number of network users grows. It
seems very likely that the optimality of restart strategies will fail to hold and that positive
waiting times will be optimal since the customers are no longer able to deduce the cause of
their failed attempts.
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